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D. Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax: (801) 595-0300 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
-oooOooo-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
GREG TUCKER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 990275-CA 
Priority No. 2 
This is an appeal of the trial court's failure to sustain the defendant's 
objection regarding the state's failure to produce discoverable information and 
adequately respond to the defendant's Request for Bill of Particulars. In this matter, 
the defendant submitted a Request for Discovery and a Request for Bill of Particulars. 
It was not until the day of trial was the defendant apprized of the prosecution's theory 
that the defendant violated an Ex Parte Protective Order, rather than a Protective Order 
as alleged in the information. Such failures unfairly prejudiced the defendant at trial as 
the defendant did not have adequate opportunity to prepare a defense against a claimed 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
violation of the Ex Parte Protective Order. Mr. Oliver, attorney for defendant, knew 
that the time-line did not match regarding the protective order. The alleged incident 
occurred on September 2, 1998. The defendant had not been served with the Protective 
Order until after that date. Thus, no violation of the Protective Order, or law, 
occurred-that was the defense's theory going into trial the morning of January 22, 
1999. When the issue of the State's failure was raised, the court ruled that the Ex 
Parte Protective Order is a Protective Order. However true that may be, without 
concession, the problem still remained as the prosecution failed to clearly disclose it's 
theory of the case timely. Within the Cohabitant Abuse Act, the Act defines the 
meanings of both Protective Order and Ex Parte Protective Order and it was reasonable 
for the defense to believe that the State intended to show a violation of the Protective 
Order and not of the ex parte order. This is especially true when Section 76-5-108 
specifically names both orders allowing for a violation of either. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 
(1953, as amended) (2)(e) (appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except 
those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony). The appellant appeals 
the final order and judgment of the Seventh Judicial District Court, in and for Grand 
County involving his conviction of a Violation of a Protective Order, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1953, as amended). 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the defendant had been denied due process of law by the State's 
failure to provide him with adequate notice of the State's intended case. 
2. Whether an Ex Parte Protective Order is a Protective Order, within the 
intended meaning which would remove the State of the obligation to provide the 
defendant with adequate notice in order to prepare his defense. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
(l)-(2). The defendant was denied due process of law and he was not 
afforded adequate notice in order to prepare a defense. The State's Information filed in 
this matter was defective, and the State failed to respond to the defense's timely filed 
Request for Bill of Particulars. 
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 
P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). Utah appellate courts review questions of law under 
a correction of error standard, without deference to the trial court. Bellon v. 
Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991); Ward, 798 P.2d at 759. 
State v. Bagshaw. 836 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Because the application of a statute is a question of law, the appellate court must review 
for correctness the actions of the trial court. See State v. Grate, 947 P.2d 1161, 1164 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
[Included herewith in Addendum A.] 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case: 
This case arises from an appeal of die final judgment of the Seventh 
District Court. On September 18, 1998, the State filed an Information against Mr. 
Tucker claiming a violation of "a protective order issued by this Court after having 
been properly served with it." (R. at 1). This charge was never amended. The defense 
knew that the State would be unable to prove timely service (and knowledge) because 
the Protective Order had not been served upon die defendant at the time of the incident. 
The order had only been entered on September 2, 1998. (See Addendum B). 
Meanwhile, in response to me defense's request for discovery and request for a bill of 
particulars, me prosecution only provided die defense a copy of the information 
claiming a violation of me "protective order" and failed to attempt any supplementation 
or revision. 
On die day of trial, January 22, 1999, die defense presented me trial court 
witii Mr. Tucker's Motion to Dismiss. (R. at 52-62, Addendum C). In die defense's 
motion, me defense claims numerous technical errors regarding the protective order. 
The motion should have been dispositive of die issues suspect for trial. But for die 
judge's avoidance of die issue by substituting die protective order wim die ex parte, 
trial would not have occurred. The judge's decision relieved die State of its legal 
obligations abridging Mr. Tucker's constitutional rights which resulted in substantial 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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prejudice. This appeal followed. 
//. Course of the Proceedings: 
On September 18, 1998, The State filed it's Information against Mr. 
Tucker claiming a violation of the September 2, 1998 protective order. (R. at 1). The 
alleged incident occurred on that same date, September 2nd. Mr. Oliver was retained 
and he entered his appearance on October 5, 1998. (R. at 5-14). This appearance was 
accompanied by a Request for Discovery as well as a Request for Bill of Particulars. 
(Supra.) The State's response to the request for a bill of particulars merely referenced 
to the State Information filed against Mr. Tucker. 
Believing the State's Information to be accurate depiction of the State's 
case, Mr. Tucker prepared a defense against the alleged Protective Order. Trial was 
subsequently held on January 22, 1999 after the trial judge ruled that the State could 
proceed with trial on the claims for violating the ex parte order. This trial day 
substitution prejudiced the defense at trial because the defense's exhibits were 
Protective Order related not Ex Parte Protective Order related. After the denial of the 
defense's motion to dismiss, the jury returned to the courtroom and the State presented 
it's case. 
///. Disposition in Trial Court: 
The trial jury returned a verdict of guilty. 
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IV. Statement of Facts: 
See part II above.1 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under Section 76-5-108, Mr. Tucker was convicted of violating an Ex 
Parte Protective Order, a Class A Misdemeanor. However, this theory was not the 
purported case for the State up till the day of trial. The State's theory apparently 
changed upon notice, or receipt of the faxed copy of the defense's motion to dismiss. 
Nevertheless, at the trial, die court allowed me State to proceed with trial on the 
premise that Mr. Tucker violated the Ex Parte Protective Order. At no time prior to 
this date did me defense suspect that the State's case could change the day of trial. 
Discovery and requests for Bills of Particular were submitted and are designed to avoid 
this type of surprise during trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN SURSTA NT!A TJJ DEPRIVED OF DUE 
PROCESS BY DIRECTLY VIOLATING THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSES OF 
THE CONSTITUTIONS. 
Mr. Tucker has certain rights as an accused person. Under me Fifth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, 
1
 The course of the proceedings is the nature of this appeal. 
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an accused person enjoys certain inalienable rights, including among other things, the 
right to be confronted with his charges prior to trial so as to benefit him with the 
opportunity to prepare an adequate defense. 
(1) Constitutional Provisions. 
The Utah State Constitution provides, in pertinent part: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12. Moreover, the Constitution states: 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be 
prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a 
magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the accused with the 
consent of the State, or by indictment, with or without such examination 
and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and 
duties thereof shall be prescribed by the Legislature. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 13. 
The U.S. Constitution provides the same protections, under the Fifth, Sixth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments. 
These redundant and overlapping constitutional protections are best 
explained in the Utah Constitution Article I, Section 26 and 27, which provides: 
7 
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The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by 
expressed words they are declared to be otherwise. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 26. 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of 
individual rights and the perpetuity of free government. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 27. 
(2) Statutory Provisions. ? 
Section 77-14-1 provides: 
The prosecuting attorney, on timely written demand of the defendant, shall within 
ten days, or such other time as the court may allow, specify in writing as 
particularly as is known to him the place, date and time of the commission of the 
offense charged. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-1 (1997). 
(3) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides: 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indictment or 
information sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offense has been 
committed. 
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the defendant 
is being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by common law or by 
statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to give 
the defendant notice of the charge. An information may contain or be 
accompanied by a statement of facts sufficient to make out probable cause to 
sustain the offense charged where appropriate. Such things as time, place, 
means, intent, manner, value and ownership need not be alleged unless 
necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money, securities, written 
instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments may be described by any name or 
description by which they are generally known or by which they may be identified 
without setting forth a copy. However, details concerning such things may be 
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obtained through a bill of particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor matters 
of judicial notice need be stated. 
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an indictment or 
information. 
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any time 
before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the substantial 
rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or 
information may be amended so as to state the offense with such particularity as to 
bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon the same set of facts. 
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to inform a 
defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to enable him to 
prepare his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for a bill of 
particulars. The motion shall be filed at arraignment or within ten days thereafter, 
or at such later time as the court may permit. The court may, on its own motion, 
direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of particulars may be amended or 
supplemented at any time subject to such conditions as justice may require. The 
request for and contents of a bill of particulars shall be limited to a statement of 
factual information needed to set forth the essential elements of the particular 
offense charged. 
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any name 
contained therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated. 
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse or proviso contained 
in the statute creating or defining the offense. 
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual meaning 
unless they are otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal meaning, 
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not invalidate the 
indictment or information. 
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or information was 
based shall be endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall not 
affect the validity but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on application of 
the defendant. Upon request the prosecuting attorney shall, except upon a showing 
of good cause, furnish the names of other witnesses he proposes to call whose 
names are not so endorsed. 
9 
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(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to appear 
before the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel. Proceedings 
against a corporation shall be the same as against a natural person. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
B. Mr. Tucker was Deprived of Due Process as a Result of the State's Trial Day 
Change in the Theory of the State's Case-Defective Notice. 
In this matter, the prosecution failed to disclose it's intended case alleging a 
violation of the Ex Parte Protective Order. The State seemed insistent that it claimed a 
violation of the "Protective Order". (R. at 1). The defense believes that the prosecution 
changed it's theory on the case only as a result of receiving a copy of the defense's 
motion to dismiss. Unfortunately, the change in the theory did not come out until the day 
of trial. The trial judge allowed trial to proceed on the premise that Mr. Tucker violated 
the Ex Parte Protective Order entered by the court on July 30, 1998, rather than the 
Protective Order entered by the court on September 2, 1998. 
r
 Rule 4, supra., states when a defendant may file for a Bill of Particulars. In 
the case at hand, the defense did timely render such a request. In response, the plaintiff 
reasserted it's case to be that Mr. Tucker violation the Protective Order as set forth in the 
State's Information. The purpose of a request for a bill of particulars is to avoid the very 
problem, the surprise which occurred in this trial. 
The issue of bills of particulars was addressed very clearly by the Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. Wilcox. 808 P.2d 1028 (1991). The Court's opinion reads: 
10 
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We first consider the state constitutional provisions that grant a defendant a right 
to adequate notice of the charged offense. The right to adequate notice may be 
based on the general due process clause in article I, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution. Utah Const, art. I, § 7. It may also be based on the more specific 
guarantee in article I, section 12, which states that "the accused shall have the 
right... to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, [and] to 
have a copy thereof." Utah Const, art. I, § 12. With regard to the issues presented 
here, this court has held that the analysis under the due process clause is not 
different from that required by article I, section 12. State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 
1214 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1044, 108 S. Ct. 777, 98 L. Ed. 2d 864 
(1988). Essentially, the constitutional question is whether "a criminal defendant 
[is] sufficiently apprised of the particulars of the charge to be able to 'adequately 
prepare his defense.1" Icl (quoting State v. Burnett, 712 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah 
1985)). 
In determining whether a defendant has been denied this right, we follow a rather 
elaborate analysis that focuses on Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(e) and 
section 77-14-1 of the Code, the provisions that implement the constitutional 
guarantee. See Utah R. Crim. P. 4(e); Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-1 (1990). Only 
after we have found that a defendant has not waived the rights the statute and rule 
provide do we decide whether the notice given was adequate. See Fulton, 742 
P.2datl215. 
As Fulton explained, the notice to which a defendant is constitutionally entitled 
may come through one or all of three sources: the charging information, a 
response to a bill of particulars under rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, or a response, under section 77-14-1 of the Code, to a demand for the 
place, date, and time of the offense charged. See Fulton. 742 P.2d at 1214. Utah 
law provides that a defendant who so requests is entitled as a matter of right to 
both a bill of particulars and a specification of the date, place, and time of the 
charged crime. Id; State v. Robbins. 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985); see also 
State v. Solomon. 93 Utah 70, 75, 71 P.2d 104, 106 (1937). However, if a 
defendant fails to request a bill of particulars or make demand for the date, place, 
and time under section 77-14-1 and a response to either of 
these would have cured the claimed deficiency, then he or she will be deemed to 
have waived the constitutional right to adequate notice. Fulton. 742 P.2d at 1215. 
If the defendant has not waived the right to more specific information and the 
State has responded with the best information it has, or if the defendant has not 
requested additional information but the information if requested would not have 
i i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
given further notice, then we proceed to determine whether the notice supplied to 
the defendant is constitutionally adequate. Id The right to adequate notice in the 
Utah Constitution requires the prosecution to state the charge with sufficient 
specificity to protect the defendant from multiple prosecutions for the same crime 
and to give notice sufficient for the one charged to prepare a defense. Id at 1214; 
State v. Strand 720 P.2d 425, 427 (Utah 1986); State v. Bundv. 684 P.2d 58, 62 
(Utah 1984); State v. Mvers. 5 Utah 2d 365, 371, 302 P.2d 276, 279 (1956). 
Because of the almost infinite variety of circumstances where the question may 
arise, there are few ironclad rules for determining the adequacy of notice beyond 
the requirement that the elements of the offense be alleged. See Utah R. Crim. P. 
4(a). In the area of variance between the allegations and the proof at trial, we 
have some helpful precedent. See, e.g., State v. Marcum. 750 P.2d 599, 601-02 
(Utah 1988); Strand. 720 P.2d at 428; State v. Burnett. 712 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah 
1985); McNairv. Havward 666 P.2d 321, 326 (Utah 1983); Utah R. Crim. P. 
30(a). But outside that area, a challenge to the constitutional adequacy of notice 
inevitably draws us into a generalized weighing of the completeness of the notice 
and its adequacy for the defendant's purposes against the background of the 
information legitimately available to the prosecuting authority. 
Id In the case at hand, Mr. Tucker had not been adequately provided notice, thus 
violating the due process protections guaranteed to him. He did not waive his right to 
more specific information, rather he exercised that right. Utah law provides that a 
defendant who so requests a bill of particulars is entitled as a matter of right to both a bill 
of particulars and a specification of the date, place, and time of the charged. Mr. Tucker, 
in this case, made his request for more specific information on or about October 5, 1998, 
just a little more than two weeks from the filing date of the information. 
In addition to being entitled to dates, places, and times, the nature and 
cause of the offense the prosecution must be disclose additional specific information 
upon the request by the defendant. This information includes information relating to 
12 
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means, intent, manner, and other related factual evidence necessary to charge the 
offense. Moreover, the State must describe such things^as written instruments, pictures, 
statutes and judgments may be described by any name or description by which they are 
generally known, this would include the correct order allegedly violated. However, in 
violation of the Utah State Constitution. Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-L and Rule 4 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the prosecution merely responded with a reference to 
the filed Information. This the response the State provided was insufficient, thus 
violating Mr. Tucker's right to due process. 
At the trial, when the defense raised this issue was addressed by the 
defense, the trial judge responded with, "Denied. When you wait until two days before 
the trial to indicate what you think his theory is, I don't think Mr. Benge has to 
immediately call you and tell you that he thinks you're mistaken about that, and an ex 
parte protective order is a protective order. The Court will be in recess." (R. at 15 pg. 
8).2 
The trial court may be right, an ex parte protective order is a protective 
order. However, there are distinctions. The Legislature specifically defined them 
separately so that the Legislature could provide an accused person with notice that he 
may be charged with violating either a protective order or an ex parte protective order. 
2
 The clerk of the trial court did not individually paginate the trial transcript, only 
the cover was marked as 115 of the record. Therefore, pages referred to in the transcript 
will be cited as the Record followed by "@" and the page number of the transcript itself. 
13 
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In section 30-6-1(7) of the Utah Code, "'Ex parte protective order' means an order 
issued without notice to the defendant in accordance with this chapter." In section 30-
6-1(11) of the Utah Code, "'Protective order' means a restraining order issued pursuant 
to this chapter subsequent to a hearing on the petition, of which the petitioner has given 
notice in accordance with this chapter." 
- Meanwhile, in the criminal code, section 76-5-108 criminalizes violations 
of either protective orders or ex parte protective orders. In particular, the statute 
provides: 
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to a protective order 
or ex parte protective order issued under Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse 
. Act, or Title 78, Chapter 3a, Juvenile Court Act of 1996, Title 77, Chapter 36, 
Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, or a foreign protective order as described in 
Section 30-6-12, who intentionally or knowingly violates that order after having 
been properly served, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, except as a greater 
penalty may be provided in Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures 
Act. 
(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection (1) is a domestic violence 
offense under Section 77-36-1 and subject to increased penalties in accordance 
with Section 77-36-1.1. 
Id. In light of the language of section 76-5-108, the prosecution is required to clarify 
it's intentions by disclosing it's theory on the case upon the request of the defendant. 
It's not unreasonable for the State to identify whether it intends to prosecute the 
defendant for a knowing violation of the ex parte protective order or of the protective 
order. 
As a result of the State's errant disclosure to the defense, the defense 
14 
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believed the State was claiming Mr. Tucker violated the Protective Order, so the 
defense prepared it's case against the Protective Order, alone. This belief is self-
evident by the issues raised in the defense's motion to dismiss. The defense's motion 
should have disposed of the case. Instead, the trial court saved the State's case at the 
expense of Mr. Tucker's constitutional rights. The State should have been held 
accountable for it's error; the trial court should have granted the defense's motion to 
dismiss. Obviously, this would mean the State could have refiled claiming a violation 
of the ex parte order, however, the defense believes even that claim was defensible on 
the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Tucker has been unjustiy treated in this matter. The trial court 
should not have denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. The State had 126 days to 
provide the defendant notice of the State's intended theory that Mr. Tucker violated the 
ex parte protective order. The day-of-trial disclosure of Ae State's actual allegation 
appears to be out of convenience, due to the defense's notice to the prosecution of the 
motion to dismiss. As a result, Mr. Tucker was deprived of due process and he was 
prevented an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense to the State's allegations. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of 
March, 2000. 
% & 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 27th day of March, 2000, 
I served a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the counsel for the 
Appellee in this matter, by mailing it to the State of Utah by first class mail with 
sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: William L. Benge, Grand County 
Attorney, 125 East Center Street, Moab, Utah 84532. ' 
Dated this 27th day of March. 2000. 
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D. BRUCE OLIVER 
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM A 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
PREAMBLE 
Article 
I. Declaration of Rights 
II. State Boundaries 
III. Ordinance 
IV. Elections and Right of Suffrage 
V. Distribution of Powers 
VI. Legislative Department 
VII. Executive Department 
VIII. Judicial Department 
IX. Congressional and Legislative Apportionment 
X. Education 
XI. Counties, Cities and Towns 
XI. Local Governments [Proposed] 
XII. Corporations 
XIII. Revenue and Taxation 
XIV. Public Debt 
XV. Militia 
XVI. Labor 
XVII. Water Rights 
XVIII. Forestry 
XIX. Public Buildings and State Institutions 
XX. Public Lands 
XXI. Salaries 
XXII. Miscellaneous 
XXIII. Amendment and Revision 
XXIV. Schedule 
PREAMBLE 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the people 
of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate the principles of 
free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITU-
TION. 1896 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
[Religious liberty.] [Proposed.] 
5. [Habeas corpus.] 
6. [Right to bear arms.] 
7. [Due process of law.] 
8. [Offenses bailable.] 
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.] 
10. [Trial by jury.] 
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.] 
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of war-
rant.] 
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.] 
19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
22. [Private property for public use.] 
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
25. [Rights retained by people.] 
Section 
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
27. [Fundamental rights.] 
28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.] 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect 
property; to worship according to the dictates of their con-
sciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right. 1896 
Sec. 2. [All polit ical power inherent in the people.] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free 
governments are founded on their authority for their equal 
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or 
reform their government as the public welfare may require. 
Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the Federal 
Union and the Constitution of the United States is the 
supreme law of the land. 1896 
Sec. 4. [Religious l iberty — N o property qualification 
to vote or hold office.] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be 
required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for 
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent 
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State, 
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated 
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No 
property qualification shall be required of any person to vote, 
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution. 1896 
[Religious liberty.] [Proposed.] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be 
required as a qualification for any office of public t rust or for 
any vote a t any election; nor shall any person be incompetent 
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State, 
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated 
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. [1999] 
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public 
safety requires it. 1896 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for 
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the 
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be 
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature 
from defining the lawful use of arms. 1984 (2nd S.S.) 
Sec. 7. [Due p r o c e s s of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 1896 
679 
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Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.] 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable 
except: 
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is 
substantial evidence to support the charge; or 
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or 
parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous 
felony charge, when there is substantial evidence to 
support the new felony charge; or 
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated 
by statute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is 
substantial evidence to support the charge and the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person 
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person 
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of 
the court if released on bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal 
only as prescribed by law. 1988 (2nd s.s.) 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punish-
ments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not 
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 1896 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In capital .cases the jury shall consist of twelve 
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of 
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature 
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event 
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases 
shall be waived unless demanded. 1996 
Sec. 11. [Courts o p e n — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a party. 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to ad-
vance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of tha t examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall pre-
clude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute 
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 1994 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — 
Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indict-
ment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination 
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commit-
ment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and 
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issu-
ance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to 
be seized. 1896 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the 
t ruth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall 
appear to the jury tha t the matter charged as libelous is true, 
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact. 1896 
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of 
absconding debtors. 1896 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military, 
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the 
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their 
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be 
prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing 
contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the 
obligation of contracts shall be passed. 1896 
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying wrar 
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid 
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on 
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act. 1896 
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil 
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in 
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war 
except in a manner to be prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within this State. 1896 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation. 1896 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, 
privilege or immunity. 1896 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
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Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.] 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair 
or deny others retained by the people. 1896 
Sec. 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and 
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be 
otherwise. 1896 
Sec. 27. [Fundamental rights.] 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential 
to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free 
government. 1896 
Sec. 28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.] 
(1) l b preserve and protect victims' rights to justice and due 
process, victims of crimes have these rights, as denned by law: 
(a) To be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, 
and to be free from harassment and abuse throughout the 
criminal justice process; 
(b) Upon request, to be informed of, be present at, and 
to be heard at important criminal justice hearings related 
to the victim, either in person or through a lawful repre-
sentative, once a criminal information or indictment 
charging a crime has been publicly filed in court; and 
(c) To have a sentencing judge, for the purpose of 
imposing an appropriate sentence, receive and consider, 
without evidentiary limitation, reliable information con-
cerning the background, character, and conduct of a 
person convicted of an offense except that this subsection 
does not apply to capital cases or situations involving 
privileges. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as creating a 
cause of action for money damages, costs, or attorney's fees, or 
for dismissing any criminal charge, or relief from any criminal 
judgment. 
(3) The provisions of this section shall extend to all felony 
crimes and such other crimes or acts, including juvenile 
offenses, as the Legislature may provide. 
(4) The Legislature shall have the power to enforce and 
define this section by statute. 1994 
ARTICLE II 
STATE BOUNDARIES 
Section 
1. [State boundaries.] 
Sect ion 1. [State boundaries.] 
The boundaries of the State of Utah shall be as follows: 
Beginning at a point formed by the intersection of the 
thirty-second degree of longitude west from Washington, with 
the thirty-seventh degree of north latitude; thence due west 
along said thirty-seventh degree of north latitude to the 
intersection of the same with the thirty-seventh degree of 
longitude west from Washington; thence due north along said 
thirty-seventh degree of west longitude to the intersection of 
the same with the forty-second degree of north latitude; 
thence due east along said forty-second degree of north lati-
tude to the intersection of the same with the thirty-fourth 
degree of longitude west from Washington; thence due south 
along said thirty-fourth degree of west longitude to the inter-
section of the same with the forty-first degree of north lati-
tude; thence due east along said forty-first degree of north 
latitude to the intersection of the same with the thirty-second 
degree of longitude west from Washington; thence due south 
along said thirty-second degree of west longitude to the place 
of beginning. 1896 
ARTICLE i n 
ORDINANCE 
Section 
[Religious toleration — Polygamy forbidden.] 
[Right to public domain disclaimed — Taxation of 
lands — Exemption.] 
[Territorial debts assumed.] 
[Free nonsectarian schools.] 
The following ordinance shall be irrevocable without the 
consent of the United States and the people of this State: 
[Religious toleration — Polygamy forbidden.] 
First: — Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaran-
teed. No inhabitant of this State shall ever be molested in 
person or property on account of his or her mode of religious 
worship; but polygamous or plural marriages are forever 
prohibited. 1896 
[Right to public domain disclaimed — Taxation of lands 
— Exemption.] 
Second: — The people inhabiting this State do affirm and 
declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the 
unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries 
hereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held 
by any Indian or Indian tribes, and tha t until the title thereto 
shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same 
shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United 
States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute 
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States. 
The lands belonging to citizens of the United States, residing 
without this State shall never be taxed a t a higher rate than 
the lands belonging to residents of this State; but nothing in 
this ordinance shall preclude this state from taxing, as other 
lands are taxed, any lands owned or held by any Indian who 
has severed his tribal relations, and has obtained from the 
United States or from any person, by patent or other grant, a 
title thereto, save and except such lands as have been or may 
be granted to any Indian or Indians under any act of Congress, 
containing a provision exempting the lands thus granted from 
taxation, which last mentioned lands shall be exempt from 
taxation so long, and to such extent, as is or may be provided 
in the act of Congress granting the same. 1945 
[Territorial debts assumed.] 
Third: — All debts and liabilities of the Territory of Utah, 
incurred by authority of the Legislative Assembly thereof, are 
hereby assumed and shall be paid by this State. 1896 
[Free nonsectarian schools.] 
Fourth: — The Legislature shall make laws for the estab-
lishment and maintenance of a system of public schools, which 
shall be open to all the children of the State and be free from 
sectarian control. 1896 
ARTICLE IV 
ELECTIONS AND RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE 
Section 
1. [Equal political rights.] 
2. ^[Qualifications to vote.] 
3. [Voters — Immunity from arrest.] 
4. [Voters — Immunity from militia duty.] 
5. [Voters to be citizens of United States.] 
6. [Mentally incompetent persons, convicted felons, and cer-
tain criminals ineligible to vote.] 
7. [Property qualification forbidden.] 
8. [Ballot to be secret.] 
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21 HUSBAND AND WIFE 30-6-1 
CHAPTER 5 
GRANDPARENTS 
Section 
30-5-1. Definitions. 
30-5-2. Visitation rights of grandparents. 
30-5-1. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "District court" means the district court within 
whose jurisdiction the grandchildren reside. 
(2) "Grandchildren'' means the child or children tha t a 
grandparent is seeking visitation rights with under this 
chapter. 
(3) "Grandparent" means a person whose child is the 
parent of the grandchildren. 1992 
30-5-2. Visitation rights of grandparents. 
(1) The district court may grant grandparents reasonable 
rights of visitation, if it is in the best interest of the grand-
children, in cases where a grandparent's child has died or has 
become a noncustodial parent through divorce or legal sepa-
ration. 
(2) In cases other than those described in Subsection (1), a 
grandparent may petition the court for reasonable rights of 
visitation with a grandchild. The court may enter an order 
granting the petitioner reasonable visitation rights in accor-
dance with the provisions and requirements of this Subsection 
(2). There is a presumption that a parent's decision with 
regard to grandparent visitation is reasonable. The court may 
override the parent's decision and grant reasonable visitation 
rights to a grandparent if it finds that: 
(a) it is in the best interest of the grandchild; 
(b) the petitioner is a fit and proper person to have 
rights of visitation with the grandchild; 
(c) the petitioner has repeatedly attempted to visit the 
grandchild and has not been allowed to visit the grand-
child as a direct result of the actions of the parent or 
parents; 
(d) there is no other way for the petitioner to visit the 
grandchild without court intervention; and 
(e) the petitioner has, by clear and convincing evidence, 
rebutted the presumption that the parent's decision to 
refuse or limit visitation with the grandchild was reason-
able. 
(3) Adoption of a child, voluntary or involuntary termina-
tion of parental rights, or relinquishment to a licensed child 
placing agency terminates all rights of a biological grandpar-
ent to petition for visitation under this section. 
(4) Grandparents may petition the court as provided in 
Section 78-32-12.2 to remedy a parent's wrongful noncompli-
ance with a visitation order. 1998 
CHAPTER 6 
COHABITANT ABUSE ACT 
'good 
;er an 
/orce, 
1983 
Section 
30-6-1. 
30-6-2. 
30-6-3. 
30-6-4. 
30-6-4.1. 
30-6-4.2. 
30-6-4.3. 
Definitions. 
Abuse or danger of abuse — Protective orders. 
Venue of action. 
Forms for petitions and protective orders — 
Assistance. 
Continuing duty to inform court of other proceed-
ings — Effect of other proceedings. 
Protective orders — Ex parte protective orders — 
Modification of orders — Service of process — 
Duties of the court. 
Hearings on ex parte orders. 
Section 
30-6-4.4. 
30-6-4.5. 
30-6-4.6. 
30-6-4.8. 
30-6-5 to 30 
30-6-8. 
30-6-9, 30-6 
30-6-11. 
30-6-12. 
30-6-14. 
No denial of relief solely because of lapse of time. 
Mutual protective orders prohibited. 
Prohibition of court-ordered or court-referred 
mediation. 
Electronic monitoring of domestic violence of-
fenders. 
6-7. Repealed. 
Statewide domestic violence network — Peace 
officers' duties — Prevention of abuse in ab-
sence of order — Limitation of liability. 
10. Repealed. 
Division of Child and Family Services — Devel-
opment and assistance of volunteer network. 
Full faith and credit for foreign protective orders. 
Authority to prosecute class A misdemeanor vio-
lations. 
30-6-1. Def ini t ions . 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Abuse" means attempting to cause, or intentionally 
or knowingly causing to an adult or minor physical harm 
or intentionally placing another in fear of imminent 
physical harm. 
(2) "Cohabitant" means an emancipated person pursu-
ant to Section 15-2-1 or a person who is 16 years of age or 
older who: 
(a) is or was a spouse of the other party; 
(b) is or was living as if a spouse of the other party; 
(c) is related by blood or marriage to the other 
party; 
(d) has one or more children in common with the 
other party; or 
(e) resides or has resided in the same residence as 
the other party. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), "cohabitant" does 
not include: 
(a) the relationship of natural parent, adoptive 
parent, or step-parent to a minor; or 
(b) the relationship between natural , adoptive, 
step, or foster siblings who are under 18 years of age. 
(4) "Court clerk" means a district court clerk or juvenile 
court clerk. 
(5) "Department" means the Department of Human 
Services. 
(6) "Domestic violence" means the same as that term is 
defined in Section 77-36-1. 
(7) "Ex parte protective order" means an order issued 
without notice to the defendant in accordance with this 
chapter. 
(8) "Foreign protective order" means a protective order 
issued by another state, territory, or possession of the 
United States, tribal lands of the United States, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia 
shall be given full faith and credit in Utah, if the protec-
tive order is similar to a protective order issued in 
compliance with Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse 
Act, or Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures 
Act, and includes the following requirements: 
(a) the requirements of due process were met by 
the issuing court, including subject matter and per-
sonal jurisdiction; 
(b) the respondent received reasonable notice; and 
(c) the respondent had an opportunity for a hear-
ing regarding the protective order. 
(9) "Law enforcement unit" or "law enforcement 
agency" means any public agency having general police 
power and charged with making arrests in connection 
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with enforcement of the criminal statutes and ordinances 
of this s tate or any political subdivision. 
(10) "Peace officer" means those persons specified in 
Title 53, Chapter 13, Peace Officer Classifications. 
(11) "Protective order" means a restraining order is-
sued pursuant to this chapter subsequent to a hearing on 
the petition, of which the petitioner has given notice in 
accordance with this chapter. 1998 
30-6-2. A b u s e or danger of abuse — Protect ive orders. 
(1) Any cohabitant or any child residing with a cohabitant 
who has been subjected to abuse or domestic violence, or to 
whom there is a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of 
abuse or domestic violence, may seek an ex parte protective 
order or a protective order in accordance with this chapter, 
whether or not that person has left the residence or the 
premises in an effort to avoid further abuse. 
(2) (a) A petition for a protective order may be filed under 
this chapter regardless of whether an action for divorce 
between the parties is pending. 
(b) If a complaint for divorce has already been filed in 
district court, a petition under this chapter may be filed as 
part of the divorce proceedings. 
(3) A cohabitant, the department, or any person or institu-
tion interested in a minor may seek a protective order on 
behalf of the minor under the circumstances described in 
Subsection (1), regardless of whether the minor could have 
filed a petition on his own behalf. If a cohabitant intends to 
seek a protective order on his own behalf and on behalf of a 
minor, a single petition may be filed. 
(4) The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent 
the minor if the court considers the appointment necessary for 
the welfare of the minor. 
(5) The county attorney or district attorney, if appropriate, 
shall represent the department where the department ap-
pears as a petitioner. 
(6) A petition seeking a protective order may not be with-
drawn without approval ofthe court. 1996 
30-6-3. Venue of act ion. 
(1) The district court has jurisdiction of any action brought 
under this chapter. The juvenile court has concurrent juris-
diction of an action brought under this chapter if a protective 
order is sought on behalf of a minor unless the petition is filed 
by a natural parent, adoptive parent, or step-parent of the 
minor against a natural parent, adoptive parent, or step-
parent of the minor. 
(2) An action brought pursuant to this chapter shall be filed 
in the county where either party resides or in which the action 
complained of took place. 1995 
30-6-4. Forms for pet i t ions and protective orders — 
Assistance. 
(1) (a) The offices ofthe court clerk shall provide forms and 
nonlegal assistance to persons seeking to proceed under 
this chapter. 
(b) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall de-
velop and adopt uniform forms for petitions and orders for 
protection in accordance with the provisions of this chap-
ter on or before September 1, 1995. That office shall 
provide the forms to the clerk of each court authorized to 
issue protective orders. The forms shall include: 
(i) a statement notifying the petitioner for an ex 
parte protective order that knowing falsification of 
any statement or information provided for the pur-
pose of obtaining a protective order may subject the 
petitioner to felony prosecution; 
(ii) a separate portion of the form for those provi-
sions, the violation of which is a criminal offense, and 
a separate portion for those provisions, the violation 
of which is a civil violation, as provided in Subsection 
30-6-4.2(5); 
(hi) language in the criminal provision portion 
stating violation of any criminal provision is a class A 
misdemeanor, and language in the civil portion stat-
ing violation of or failure to comply with a civil 
provision is subject to contempt proceedings; 
(iv) a space for information the petitioner is able to 
provide to facilitate identification of the respondent, 
such as social security number, driver license num-
ber, date of birth, address, telephone number, and 
physical description; 
(v) a space for the petitioner to request a specific 
period of time for the civil provisions to be in effect, 
not to exceed 150 days, unless the petitioner provides 
in writing the reason for the requested extension of 
the length of time beyond 150 days; 
(vi) a statement advising the petitioner that when 
a minor child is included in an ex parte protective 
order or a protective order, as part of either the 
criminal or the civil portion of the order, the peti-
tioner may provide a copy ofthe order to the principal 
of the school where the child attends; and 
(vii) a statement advising the petitioner that if the 
respondent fails to return custody of a minor child to 
the petitioner as ordered in a protective order, the 
petitioner may obtain from the court a writ of assis^ 
tance. 
(2) If the person seeking to proceed under this chapter is 
not represented by an attorney, i t is the responsibility of the 
court clerk's office to provide: 
(a) the forms adopted pursuant to Subsection (1); 
(b) all other forms required to petition for an order for 
protection including, but not limited to, forms for service; 
(c) clerical assistance in filling out the forms and filing 
the petition, in accordance with Subsection (l)(a). A court 
clerk's office may designate any other entity, agency, or 
person to provide tha t service, but the court clerk's office 
is responsible to see tha t the service is provided; 
(d) information regarding the means available for the 
service of process; 
(e) a list of legal service organizations tha t may repre-
sent the petitioner in an action brought under this chap-
ter, together with the telephone numbers of those organi-
zations; and 
(f) written information regarding the procedure for 
transporting a jailed or imprisoned respondent to the 
protective order hearing, including an explanation of the 
use of transportation order forms when necessary. 
(3) No charges may be imposed by a court clerk, constable, 
or law enforcement agency for: 
(a) filing a petition under this chapter; 
(b) obtaining an ex parte protective order; 
(c) obtaining copies, either certified or not certified, 
necessary for service or delivery to law enforcement 
officials; or 
(d) fees for service of a petition, ex parte protective 
order, or protective order. 
(4) A petition for an order of protection shall be in writing 
and verified. 
(5) (a) All orders for protection shall be issued in the form 
adopted by the Administrative Office ofthe Courts pursu-
ant to Subsection (1). 
(b) Each protective order issued, except orders issued 
ex parte, shall include the following language: 
"Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity 
to be heard in the hearing tha t gave rise to this order. 
Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, P.L. 
103-32 
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76-5-108 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 290 
(c) class A misdemeanor if the act involves the opera-
tion or other use of a motor vehicle; 
(d) third degree felony if the act involves the use of a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; 
(e) third degree felony if the hazing results in serious 
bodily injury to a person; or 
(f) second degree felony if hazing under Subsection 
(3)(e) involves the use of a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601. 
(4) A person who in good faith reports or participates in 
reporting of an alleged hazing is not subject to any civil or 
criminal liability regarding the reporting. 
(5) (a) This section does not apply to military training or 
other official military activities. 
(b) Military conduct is governed by Title 39, Chapter 6, 
Utah Code of Military Justice. 
(6) (a) A prosecution under this section does not bar a 
prosecution of the actor for: 
(i) any other offense for which the actor may be 
liable as a party for conduct committed by the person 
hazed; or 
(ii) any offense, caused in the course of the hazing, 
that the actor commits against the person who is 
hazed. 
(b) Under Subsection (6)(a)(i) a person may be sepa-
rately punished, both for the hazing offense and the 
conduct committed by the person hazed. 
(c) Under Subsection (6)(a)(ii) a person may not be 
punished both for hazing and for the other offense, but 
shall be punished for the offense carrying the greater 
maximum penalty. 1997 
76-5-108. Protect ive orders restraining abuse of an-
other — Violation. 
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject 
to a protective order or ex parte protective order issued under 
Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse Act, or Title 78, Chapter 
3a, Juvenile Court Act of 1996, Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabi-
tant Abuse Procedures Act, or a foreign protective order as 
described in Section 30-6-12, who intentionally or knowingly 
violates that order after having been properly served, is guilty 
of a class A misdemeanor, except as a greater penalty may be 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Proce-
dures Act. 
(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection (1) is a 
domestic violence offense under Section 77-36-1 and subject to 
increased penalties in accordance with Section 77-36-1.1. 
1999 
76-5-109. Child abuse. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Child" means a human being who is 17 years of age 
or less. 
(b) "Child abuse" means any offense described in Sub-
section (2) or (3), or in Section 76-5-109.1. 
(c) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of 
a child which impairs the physical condition of the child, 
including: 
(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin; 
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion; 
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or 
(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's 
health or welfare and which is not a serious physical 
injury as defined in Subsection (l)(d). 
(d) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury 
or set of injuries which seriously impairs the child's 
health, or which involves physical torture or causes seri-
ous emotional harm to the child, or which involves a 
substantial risk of death to the child, including: 
m frftW,,rn ~f o „ „ U ~ 1 
(ii) intracranial bleeding, swelling or contusion of 
the brain, whether caused by blows, shaking, or 
causing the child's head to impact with an object or 
surface; 
(iii) any burn, including burns inflicted by hot 
water, or those caused by placing a hot object upon 
the skin or body of the child; 
(iv) any injury caused by use of a dangerous 
weapon as denned in Section 76-1-601; 
(v) any combination of two or more physical inju-
ries inflicted by the same person, either at the same 
time or on different occasions; 
(vi) any damage to internal organs of the body; 
(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in 
severe emotional harm, severe developmental delay 
or retardation, or severe impairment of the child's 
ability to function; 
(viii) any injury which creates a permanent disfig-
urement or protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of a bodily member, limb, or organ; 
(ix) any conduct which causes a child to cease 
breathing, even if resuscitation is successful follow-
ing the conduct; or 
(x) any conduct which results in starvation or 
failure to thrive or malnutrition that jeopardizes the 
child's life. 
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical 
injury or, having the care or custody of such child, causes or 
permits another to inflict serious physical injury upon a child 
is guilty of an offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a 
felony of the second degree; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third 
degree; or 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a 
class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or, 
having the care or custody of such child, causes or permits 
another to inflict physical injury upon a child is guilty of an 
offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a 
class A misdemeanor; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misde-
meanor; or 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a 
class C misdemeanor. 
(4) A parent or legal guardian who provides a child with 
treatment by spiritual means alone through prayer, in lieu of 
medical treatment, in accordance with the tenets and prac-
tices of an established church or religious denomination of 
which the parent or legal guardian is a member or adherent 
shall not, for that reason alone, be deemed to have committed 
an offense under this section. 1999 
76-5-109.1. Commission of domestic violence in the 
presence of a child. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Domestic violence" means the same as tha t term is 
defined in Section 77-36-1. 
(b) "In the presence of a child" means: 
(i) in the physical presence of a child; or 
(ii) having knowledge that a child is present and 
may see or hear an act of domestic violence. 
(2) A person is guilty of child abuse if he: 
(a) commits or attempts to commit criminal homicide, 
as defined in Section 76-5-201, against a cohabitant in the 
presence of a child; or 
(b) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to a co-
habitant or uses a dangerous weapon, as defined & 
o — A . 1 nn i r>f\i _J_T r i«i_ _ i__ .*_ _ i.-fO 
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
By: Rosalie Reilly #6637 
148 South Main Street #1 
Post Office Box 404 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Telephone & Fax: (435) 587-3266 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 East Center Street, Moab 
RACHEL TUCKER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GREG TUCKER, 
Respondent. 
This matter came on for hearing on August 19, 1998 at the hour of 3:30 p.m. in the 
Seventh District Court, the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson presiding. Petitioner was present and 
represented by her attorney, Rosalie Reilly. The Respondent was present and represented by his 
attorney, Bruce Oliver. At that time, Respondent moved to have the instant Petition dismissed 
on the basis that another Protective Order was in effect (Case No. 9647-44). Petitioner moved to 
amend, changing the Petition for Protective Order to a Petition for Modification. The Court 
granted the motion to amend and ordered the cases consolidated as case number 9847-94. Since 
that time, the Court has learned that the Protective Order in case 9647-44 was dismissed on the 
5th day of August, 1998. The Court, therefore, vacates it's order and reinstates the Petition for 
SEVENTH OSSTfliCT COURT 5 t
 Grand County 
BiEo SE? 0 2 1998 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
"Doputy 
* PROTECTIVE ORDER 
* 
* Case No. 9847-94 
* Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
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protective Order under case number 9847-94. 
Based on the testimony received, and having heard argument of the parties, the Court 
orders as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
1. The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to commit 
domestic violence or abuse against Petitioner. 
2. The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to commit 
domestic violence or abuse against the minor children, namely, Brittany Tucker, (date of birth: 
1/6/92); Trevor Tucker, (date of birth: 8/18/93); Tyler Tucker, (date of birth: 8/18/93); and other 
household members, Marcy Jarrett; Colt Jarrett and Theresa Adams. 
The Respondent is prohibited from directly or indirectly contacting, harassing, 
telephoning, or otherwise communicating with the Petitioner. 
4. The Respondent is ordered to stay away from the Petitioner's school, place of 
employment, and other places frequented by Petitioner, the minor children and designated 
family or household members. Specifically, the following addresses: 
3641 Roberts Road, Moab, Utah. 
425 South Main Street, Moab, Utah. 
300 E. 200 South ft 1, Moab, Utah. 
5. The Respondent is prohibited from purchasing, using, or possessing a firearm or other 
weapon. 
6. The Petitioner is granted permission to retrieve her essential belongings, as well as the 
& 
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children's essential belongings from the marital residence. 
7. Petitioner is granted temporary custody of the parties' minor children, namely 
Brittany, Trevor, and Tyler Tucker. 
8. The Respondent is allowed supervised visitation of the parties' minor children 
through the Department of Family Services. 
9. The Respondent is restrained from using alcohol and drugs prior to and during the 
supervised visitation with the parties' minor children. 
10. The Respondent is ordered to pay child support in the amount of $300.00 per month 
pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines. 
11. The Respondent is ordered to pay one-half of the minor children's day care expenses 
actually incurred by Petitioner. 
RESPONDENT'S VIOLATION OF PROVISIONS 1-8 OF THIS ORDER WILL 
CONSTITUTE A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR. EITHER PARTY MAY BE HELD IN 
CONTEMPT FOR IGNORING OR ALTERING HE TERMS OF THIS ORDER. 
\s*s , 1998, 
ByTHE COURT: 
DATED this . day of ^ y / ^ / / ^ ^ 
\fa& R. ANDERSON " 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Serve Respondent at: 
1171 Murphy Lane 
Moab, Utah 84532 
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D. Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Defendant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax: (801) 595-0300 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County, Utah 
FILED JAN 22 1999 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GREG TUCKER, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case no. 9817-163 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Comes now the defendant, Greg Tucker, by and through counsel, D. Bruce 
Oliver, and hereby moves this Honorable Court for a dismissal of this matter for the violation 
of the Cohabitant Abuse Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-1 et seq. and Cohabitant Abuse 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-36-1 etseq. The Protective Order allegedly violated is 
unenforceable by the State of Utah in a criminal proceeding. 
This motion is filed pursuant to the Declaration of Rights Clauses and Bill of 
Rights expressed and implied under Article I, Sections 1, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 24, 25, 26, & 27 
of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Said motion is further supported by the accompanying 
memorandum of points and authorities which is incorporated herein and annexed hereto by this 
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reference. 
In this matter, the defendant is likely to prevail on the merits of this case and 
said motion is in no way adverse to the public interest. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of 
January, 1999. ^ 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF FAXING/MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be transmitted a telefacsimile to (435) 259-3926 
and I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS, postage 
prepaid, to: William L. Benge, Grand County Attorney, 125 East Center, Moab, Utah 84532. 
Dated this 20th day of January, 1999. 
/ ' W ^ >^^ < 
LS 7
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D. Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Defendant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax: (801) 595-0300 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County, Utah 
FILED JAN 22 1999 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GREG TUCKER, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case no. 9817-163 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Comes now the defendant, Greg Tucker, by and through counsel, D. Bruce 
Oliver, and hereby submits this memorandum of points and authorities. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are based on the statements made within the Information, 
the police reports and supplemental reports prepared by the officers involved which have been 
provided to the defendant, and any logical inferences drawn therefrom. These facts are 
provided for the purpose of demonstrating a legal theory and Mr. Tucker does not concede to 
these facts or this factual scenario nor does he admit any guilt expressed or implied. 
1. The defendant and the alleged victim, Rachel Tucker, are husband and wife 
having been married for some time now. 
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2. During the course of the marriage, the two have conceived and raised two 
minor children, to wit: Brittney Tucker, a female, born January 6, 1992; Trevor Tucker, a 
male, born August 18, 1993; and Tyler Tucker, a male, boy August 18, 1993. 
3. In addition, the defendant has two stepchildren born to the victim from prior to 
their relationship, to wit: Marcy Jarrett, a female, born April 15, 1986; and Colt Jarrett, a 
male, born May 21, 1987. 
4. For the most of this relationship, the parties have been without substantial 
incident and a strong bond has been enjoyed by the parties and their children alike. 
5. At some point, the parties got into a fight and the defendant had been removed 
from the marital residence by an Ex Parte Protective Order. 
6. Then on August 19, 1998 at the hour of 3:30 p.m. the Seventh District Court 
conducted a Protective Order hearing wherein the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson granted a 
Protective Order. 
7. Said Protective was prepared by the Utah Legal Services, Inc. which is 
defective on it's face. 
8. The defendant has been subsequently charged with violating said Protective 
Order 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PROTECTIVE ORDER IS UNENFORCEABLE FOR CRIMINAL 
SANCTIONS AS IT IS VOID AND DEFECTIVE ON ITS FACE. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-6-4 outlines the form and content of a lawful 
2 
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Protective Order. This Section reads: 
(1) (a) The offices of the court clerk shall provide forms and nonlegal assistance to 
persons seeking to proceed under this chapter. 
(b) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall develop and adopt uniform forms 
for petitions and orders for protection in accordance with the provisions of this chapter 
on or before September 1, 1995. That office shall provide the forms to the clerk of 
each court authorized to issue protective orders. The forms shall include: 
(i) a statement notifying the petitioner for an ex parte protective order that 
knowing falsification of any statement or information provided for the purpose of 
obtaining a protective order may subject the petitioner to felony prosecution; 
(ii) a separate portion of the form for those provisions, the violation of which is a 
criminal offense, and a separate portion for those provisions, the violation of which is a 
civil violation, as provided in Subsection 30-6-4.2(5); 
(iii) language in the criminal provision portion stating violation of any criminal 
provision is a class A misdemeanor, and language in the civil portion stating violation 
of or failure to comply with a civil provision is subject to contempt proceedings; 
(iv) a space for information the petitioner is able to provide to facilitate 
identification of the respondent, such as social security number, driver license number, 
date of birth, address, telephone number, and physical description; 
(v) a space for the petitioner to request a specific period of time for the civil 
provisions to be in effect, not to exceed 150 days, unless the petitioner provides in 
writing the reason for the requested extension of the length of time beyond 150 days; 
(vi) a statement advising the petitioner that when a minor child is included in an 
ex parte protective order or a protective order, as part of either the criminal or the civil 
portion of the order, the petitioner may provide a copy of the order to the principal of 
the school where the child attends; and 
(vii) a statement advising the petitioner that if the respondent fails to return 
custody of a minor child to the petitioner as ordered in a protective order, the petitioner 
may obtain from the court a writ of assistance. 
(2) If the person seeking to proceed under this chapter is not represented by an 
attorney, it is the responsibility of the court clerk's office to provide: 
(a) the forms adopted pursuant to Subsection (1); 
(b) all other forms required to petition for an order for protection including, but 
not limited to, forms for service; 
(c) clerical assistance in filling out the forms and filing the petition, in accordance 
with Subsection (l)(a). A court clerk's office may designate any other entity, agency, 
or person to provide that service, but the court clerk's office is responsible to see that 
the service is provided; 
(d) information regarding the means available for the service of process; 
(e) a list of legal service organizations that may represent the petitioner in an action 
brought under this chapter, together with the telephone numbers of those organizations; 
and 
(f) written information regarding the procedure for transporting a jailed or 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
imprisoned respondent to the protective order hearing, including an explanation of the 
use of transportation order forms when necessary. 
(3) No charges may be imposed by a court clerk, constable, or law enforcement 
agency for: 
(a) filing a petition under this chapter; 
(b) obtaining an ex parte protective order; 
(c) obtaining copies, either certified or not certified, necessary for service or 
delivery to law enforcement officials; or 
(d) fees for service of a petition, ex parte protective order, or protective order. 
(4) A petition for an order of protection shall be in writing and verified. 
(5) (a) All orders for protection shall be issued in the form adopted by the 
Administrative Office of the Courts pursuant to Subsection (1). 
(b) Each protective order issued, except orders issued ex parte, shall include the 
following language: 
"Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity to be heard in the hearing 
that gave rise to this order. Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, P.L. 
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 18 U.S.C.A. 2265, this order is valid in all the United States, 
the District of Columbia, tribal lands, and United States territories." 
Id. In this matter, the Protective Order that has been allegedly violated is unlawful as it does 
not comport with Section 30-6-4 in many respects. 
A. The Protective Order is Not on the Form Uniformly Adopted by the 
Administrative Office of the Courts. 
Subsection (1) provides that the offices of the court clerk shall provide the 
necessary forms and nonlegal assistance to persons seeking to proceed under this chapter. 
These forms have been specifically developed and adopted by the Administrative Office of the 
Courts and distributed throughout the State of Utah to be uniformly provides and used by 
persons seeking Protective Orders while still providing Constitutional protection to the 
respondents or defendants of said Protective Orders. In this matter, the Protective order 
prepared by Utah Legal Services, Inc. violated Subsection (1) because it was not prepared in 
the Administrative Office of the Courts' form. 
4 
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B. The Protective Order Inappropriately Criminalizes Would Be Civil 
Provisions of the Uniform Forms. 
On the approved forms there are numbered paragraphs and alphabetical 
paragraphs. The number paragraphs are provisions if violated warrant criminal offenses. The 
alphabetical paragraphs are provisions if violated do not warrant criminal offenses. The 
numbered paragraphs provide the following: 
1. The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or 
threatening to commit abuse or domestic violence against Petitioner. 
2. The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or 
threatening to commit abuse or domestic violence against the following minor children 
and members of Petitioner's family or household: 
3. The Respondent is prohibited from directly or indirectly contacting, 
harassing, telephoning, or otherwise communicating with the Petitioner. 
4. The Respondent shall be removed and excluded, and shall stay away, 
from Petitioner's residence, and its premises, located at: 
and Respondent is prohibited from terminating or interfering with 
the utility services to the residence. 
5. The Respondent is ordered to stay away from the school, place of 
employment, and/or other places, and their premises, frequented by Petitioner, the 
minor children and the designated household and family members. These places are 
identified by the following addresses: 
6. The Court having found that Respondent's use or possession of a weapon 
may pose a serious threat of harm to Petitioner, the Respondent is prohibited from 
purchasing, using, or possessing a firearm and/or the following weapon(s): 
7. The Petitioner is awarded possession of the following residence, 
automobile and/or other essential personal effects: 
This award is subject to orders concerning the listed property in future domestic 
proceedings. 
5 
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8 An. officer from, the following law enforcement agency: 
shall accompany Petitioner to ensure that Petitioner 
safely regains possession of (he awarded nron^rtv 
• ^"ice from the same law enlorcei.ne.nt agency shall facilitate 
Respondent ^ removal of Respondent's essential personal belongings from, the parties' 
residence. The law enforcement officer shall contact Petitioner to make these 
arrangements. Respondent may not contact the Petitioner or enter the residence to 
obtain any items, 
_ _ 1.0. rhe Respondent is placed under the supervision *>t me Department of 
Corrections for the purposes of electronic monitoring. Withn; J 4 hours o r 
execution of this Order. The Department of Corrections shall place an electr* me 
inonitoring device on Respondent and shall install monitoring equipment on the 
premises of Petitioner ami r the residence of Respondent. Respondent is ordered tu 
pay the Department of Correction* the cos^ .»* me electronic monitoring required by 
this Order. The Department of Corrections shall ha\* an ess io Petitioner^ residence 
to install the appropriate monitoring eouinr 
In this matter, the prepared Protectee <)nk WA^COU* uiu Suu_ - v • 
I In* ii i If • • in Ins milk i ill so criminalizes civil provisions il-.n au designed io expire in 150 
days. • *jf defendant cannot Ocuiid**{ - " •: -.*,: * ^ 
issi^ e* • • -nuna! offenses can , ' . >e charged for intentionally cummiuiiig abuse u, 
violence. In this abuse are alleged to have b re r " i-nuonally 
committed. 
I The Protective Order Does Not Provide Mandatory Language in the 
iProtective Order. 
The Protective Order is reqtitn d to im:luili' .toim vr i v IIII|POII<IIII ;mrl specific 
olatements '"Hie order is required to include a statement advising the petitioner that when a 
minor child is included H , ider or a protective order, as part of nitlu i 
the criminal or the civil :-•' v : *: :ht- order, the petitioner may provide -> i «»p nil ihi> unit \ m 
'I"1 p " » ' pill of 11 ii M iiool tvhere Ihe child altcnds The order is required to include a 
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statement advising /;,-,; a v^u: 1 •* . ? iiw i M n r , , provision is in das1 . A niisdemcMiioi, .in Il 
language ; < a u i g \ lOjaiu-i: . * ** failure to comply with a civil provision is 
subject! o - ^ .• . uoceedings . The order i n l m in limit1 .1 Maieineiit advising ihe 
petitioner that: if the respondent foils to return custody of a minor child to the petitioner as 
ordered ii :i a pro tec ts e • :::::)i: dei , the petitionei maj obtain from the court a writ of assistance 
The order is required to include the specific language: 
Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity to be heard in the hearing that 
gave rise to this order. Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, P.L, 
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 18 U.S.C.A. 2265, this order is valid in all the I Jnited States, 
the District of Columbia, tribal lands, and United States territories. 
jf t j i e Q a s s ^ Misdemeanor provision, none of these provisions are included in 
the oi der. And as for the Class A MisdemriMM'i \i\w\ sum >, i nii'Ujnai I lit1 civil provision 
and wrongfully criminalizes non-criminal behavior, Iliese failures and omissions cause the 
II'imiifi'ii live Orrln m Iir• "'until us i is detective on il's face. 
I». The Protective Order Requires the Judge to Imimi Each Provision. 
The lorm approved by the Administrative Office of Ihe Courts require the judge 
to initial each and1 iTi 'n iwm ism i I iiiifriitk'J in Lii'i \u d i e d against the respondent or 
defendant In this matter, the Protective Order judge has not initialed each of th* • 
'Nip. iailuie and omission causes the Protective Order to h-* <uc as it 
i* defective on i t ' s face. 
I This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Proceed on the Criminal Offense in 
Light of the Void and Defective Order. 
The defniiiiiii II.II ml u o L n u l ' u u i u n A* > l*'S I hi* Section provides: 
(1) Any person who is the respondent or" defendant subject to a protective order < 
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parte protective order issuea undi r ' uL n\ \ 'napa- o, -^-habitant Abuse Act, or Title 
78, Chapter 3a, Juvenile Courts, Y \ v "* i hapter 36. Cohabitant Abuse Procedures 
Act, or a foreign protective order as described ir S<. i r, ">0-612, who intentionally 
violates that order after having been properly served, is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, except as a greater penalty may be provided in,' ritle 77, Chaplin W 
Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act 
i pendant has not violated a Protective Order as provided i inder Title 
30. ; naptcr * o ;.ww / , , Chapter 36 in light . on 30-6-4 as explained 
hereinabove. As a result of said violation, this (*oun lack> ;r fiction to proceed a-:a--
defendant. Che ilcliMuliiiil hir< Ml mttlafal n I Hie JU, i luipicr t\ lYotective Order. 
CONCLUSION 
* •• Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the defendant hereby respectfiill) reqi lests 
this Honorable ( ' " • ,,«II«I"" Mlhi • ""'i i lit- i'loteetive Order alleged to have limi 
violated by the defendam ..s vi-.. . defective on its face. 
RESP • « S UBMITTED this 20th day of 
January, 1999. 
/^<gv^<^> 
lY BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF FAXING/MAILING 
1 iicicby ccrtifv 'hai i cause;! (o In' Mansmitted a telefacsimile to (435) 259-39?6 
and I mailed •; • •.. ^ OUL MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS pnsinj'L pivpaid .. Wdliam 
L. Iknge, Grand County Attorney, 125 East Center, Moab, Utah 84532. 
Dated this 20th day ,u hiiii.uv \'">'>. 
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